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War ・I, Japanese.organized labor had never・ been accorded with 
the legal sta.tus. For all their struggle to obtain recognition 
it was a history of oppression and persecution. However, it 
should be noted that the position of orgamzed labor, being not 
legal, was not illegal, either. ;rhough trade union movement 
could have been very easily stifled out by the government, 
such movement was tolerated, the autocratic character of the 
government notwithstanding. This 1s an amazing thing itself. 
Why, then, was such tolerance made possible 7 It may be 
asserted that this is mainly because of the ILO’S contribution. 
The present article tries to show how this tolerance or de facto 
recognit10n came about through the impact of the International 
Labor Organizat10n. 
I. Introdu~tory -Freedom of Association before 1919 
1. The Meiji Government at the Take-off Stageり
As a newcommer in capitahstic competition in the world, 
Japan had to take much faster stride to catch up with her 
predecessors. Especially with such handicaps as she was 
burdened-m明 gernatural resources，叩1allyet overpopulated 
islands, no accumulated capital, threats of colonialization . it 
is no 町nailwonder that Japan should have prcvoked all her 
efforts in order to build a modern nation strong enough, both 
・economically and politically, to maintain her independence. 
The normal course of capitalist development is that, as the 
economy advances, the wokers’protests against expl01tation 
and their miserable workmg conditions get severe and workers 
gradu巴1llycombine to form a re剖stantorgamzation to protect 
their interests against employers. In the course of these events 
there are normally certain developmental stages before organized 
1. See, Tadaa Yanaihara, Gendai Nihon-Shashi (A Short 'History af 
Modern Japan), pp. 5-48, Tak, a, 1960. 
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labor gain their social recognition.り Inthe case of Japan, 
however, thmgs happened all at one time, and these usual 
route had never been followed. 
The slogan of the Mei11 Governme唱twas“Fu！三okuKyohei; 
Bummei Kaika”（Wealthy Nation-State and Strong Army; Civiliza-
tion and Enhghtenment〕.The wealthy nation meant that Japan 
as a nation-state, not her people, should be wealthy, which was 
to be achieved through rapid industrialization of the country. 
The Meiji Government took every possible measure to carry 
out this high obiective and, at the same time, to eliminate 
whatever obstacles in its way. As long as the mternal govern” 
ment was concerned, the existence of pohtical oppositions and 
the trade union movement was certainly nmsance to the eye of 
the pohtical leaders. 
Although the Emperor Mei11 issued at the outset of the 
formation of the government so called "Gokaio no Goseimon” 
(Five Sacred Oaths〕in1868 which declared as its fundamental 
political policy that the ne.w empire should be governed on 
the basis of popular dec1s1on, the Government soon had to 
reahze that the young nation could hardly afford to do it in 
face of the various menaces by the world powers she had to 
cope with. Under these circumstances may be some excuses for 
Japan to have taken the course of authoritarian government. 
Even today, in the day of democracy, it is di伍cultto assert, 
without any hesitance，“the appropriateness of democratic 
pohtical institutions" as the most effective means of achievmg 
industrrnhzation or self-sustaining economy in an underdeveloped 
country. 
At any rate fre氾domand democracy had to be controlled to 
a greater extent by way of enacting many restrictive laws m 
1. For the analysis of this pomt, see Clerk Kerr, John T. Dunlop, 
Fredrick H. Harbison, and Charles A Myers, Industrialism and 
Industrial Man, pp. 208-210. 
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Meiji Japan. These laws are usually a two-edged sword, 
applicable to both political opponents and labor leaders. With 
regard to the political opposiition, tbe Me111 Government could 
successfully control it by the 1880’s, especialJ;y“J iyu Minken" 
(liberty and civil nghts) movement, solidifying its authoritarian 
posit10n. 
2. The position of Organized Labor 
Before we go mto the theme of this article, it may be necessarγ 
to give a sketchy outhne of the Japanese labor mov白nentm 
its early stage. The development of modern trade umonism m 
Japan may be said to have commenced m 1897，り whena group 
of young men who had worked in the Umted States got together 
and set up "Shokko Giyukai” (th時三 Friendly Society of Factory 
Workers〕. They drafted and distributed widely among factorγ 
workers the first most impotant document m the history of 
Japanese trade union movement. On July 5 in the same year, 
they succeeded in getting 71 a伍liatesand thereby formed “Ro do 
Kumiai Kiseikai”（the society for the Promotion of Trade 
Unions〕whichge泊erallyacknowledged as the first trade union 
in Japan in th泡 modernsense of the word. This Society aimed 
to organize in a from-top-to-down fashion skilled male workers 
in big factories by dispatching organizers, holding meetings and 
distributmg pubhcat10ns. 
Prmters, iron workers and locomotive engmeers umons were 
the three big craft unions born out of the orgamzational efforts 
of this Society Despite severe oppress10ns of the government 
a few of the潤 survivedand reorganized themselves on more 
powerful lines m the 1920’s 2) 
Around after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 95, with the 
1 lnternational Labor Review, Vol V, No. i; Jan. 1922, p. 438 Also 
lzutara Suyehiro, Nihon Rodo Kum1ai Undo Shi (A H店toryof the 
Japanese Labour Movement), Tokyo, 1954, pp. 25. 
2 For example, Shmyu Kai See Jzutarn Suyeh1ro, op cit., pp. 37-43. 
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estabhshment of Japan's capitalism as a result of her victory, 
organized labor also strengthened its foothold and the movement 
took more radical phase combined with socialism and anarcho-
syndicahsm, which led the government to expedite the.enactment 
of more powerful官eaponsfor controllmg trade unionism. It 
was quite natural that trade unions of those days, still in their 
infancy, should have been dissipated in a short time." 
ザ Therevival came m 1912 when Yuai Kai (the Friendly Love 
Society〕wasfounded, a sort of national trade union center 
whose tradition, passed on to the post World War II period, 
led into the formation of the Sodomei (the General Federat10n 
of Japanese Labor〕.It first started by a number of intellectuals 
to promote among workers understanding toward labor problems 
and to intervene in labor disputes m order to help assist workers 
to get favorable settlement for them. Because of the govern' 
ment’s suppressive policy, they had to adopt very moderate 
policies with great caution not to be branded as“自由cals，＇’
otherwise their destiny would be imprisonment. And yet, 
workers, aspirmg for .any kind of organization of their own, 
responded quickly to the call of Yuai Kai, and in 1918, the 
membership reached to 30,000 and the number of locals totaled 
120.町
In 1919 by the time when the ILO was estabhshed under the 
Verse1lles Peace Treaty, there were on formal record 162 trade 
unions and 2,388 labor disputes, of which there were 497 strikes 
and sabotages and 335,225 WOt'kers participated. The trade 
union membership was not available until 1921, though'' 
3. Le哩aland Administrative Restrictions on Labor 
As is clear in the previous pages that, while there was no 
1. Saikin no Shakai Un</o (the Social Movements of Recent Years), 
Kyocho Kaユ， 1929,p 322 
2. Suyeh¥ro, op. c,t. ・ pp 57 -58 
3 Suyehiro, op. cit.・ pp. 66-67 
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trade union freedom as the nature of the Japanese Government 
dictated, organized labor did exist, if small in number. Let us 
turn to the actual provisions of those restrictive laws in 
operation. 
収Thefundamental legal basis of the right of association l礼
Japan is the Constitution of 1889. Article 29 of the Constitution 
reads 
Japanese shall have the freedom of speech, authorship, press, 
assembly and association withm the hmits of law. 
It clearly means that the right of Japanese citizens to form or 
iom an association is guranteed within the limits of law, that 
is, so far as the act offorming or ioinmg an association does 
not mvolve the contravention of law ”り
Then, what were the “legal limits" which constituted the 
scope of umon activi.ties ? First of all, reference must be made 
to the absence of any prohibitive Jaw explicitly banned the 
formation of trade unions.'' This absence of a“combinat10n 
act，” however, by no means equates the absence of control. 
Quite contrary, there were a network of laws, ordinances and 
regulations which functioned even more powerfully and effec-
tively than a single prohibitive law. 
For the purpose of the theme of this paper, I do 、notthmk it 
necessary to go into details of these laws.町 Hence,it may be 
sufficient only to enumerate them to md1cate what httle 
1 !LO, Studies and Reports, Series A (Inpustrial Relations〕昔32,Freedom 
of Association, 1927-30, Geneva: p. 419 
2. Mr. Tam on Maeda, the Government delegate r町田rked：“...The 
workers' freedom of association is guranteed by the Japanese Constitution 
and there is no regulation in the country restricting such freedom.": 
Cf. Proceedmgs of the International Labor Conference, Sixth Session, 
Vol I, pp. 540 543, Geneva, 1924. Also Mr Kawamura, the Chief 
of the Police Bureau of the Ministry of Internal A百airs,told・“the
establishment of trade unions is free, because no law exists in Japan 
which prohibits it.": The Tokyo Asahi, Feb 13, 1919 
3. For details see Studies and Reports, op. cit.: pp. 419-444. 
freedom was left for any union activity. Namely・ 
The public Peace Police Act 
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The provisions in the Criminal Law (the crimes of sedition, 
v10lence, mtimidation, obstruction of public or private 
business, and the like. Cf. Article 95, 106-107, 208, 222-
223, 234〕
The Admimstrative Execution Act 
The Ordinance for the Punishment of Contravention of 
Police Orders 
The Police Offence Summary Judgment Ordinance 
The Press Act 
The Publication Act 
The Regulation for Control of Roads 
There were other equivalent ordinances and regulations at 
the prefectural level. 
Among all of these, the most notorious and vicious was the 
“Chian Keisa tsu Ho”ー thePubhc Peace Police Act of 1900, 
especially its Articles 17 and 30，り whichwere very effective 
1. Article 17 : 
Neither violence, nor intimidation, nor slander in pubhc with any of 
the following objects shall be committed agamst others, nor shall 
instigation or mc1tement be committed against others with the objects 
refered to in (1i〕below・
( i〕 Tomake others 3oin or prevent them from joining associations 
formed for the purpose of C町由inedaction concerning the conditions 
of or the remuneration for work, 
( n) To make employers discharge workers or refuse apphcation for 
employment or to make workers stop their work or refuse a request 
for employment as workers, with the ob3ect of connected discharge 
of workers or of strike, 
(ii) To coerce the other party to consent to given conditions of or 
remuneration for work. 
Neither violence nor intimidation nor slander in pubhc shall be 
committed against other parties m order to coerce them to consent to 
rent conditions of land or cultivation 
Article 30: 
Those who contravene the provisions of Article 17 shall be liable to 
an imprisonment with hard labour for more than a month but less 
than six months, and in addition a fine of more than three yen but 
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weapons to :restrict both union and political activities. 
This fact that the Japanese labor was under severe control 
.bY the government is too well-known and even of common 
sense. However, this does not mean that organized labor was 
士otal)yoppressed, that is to say, their activity was not made 
illegal altogether The government did recognize union 
existence even formally In the following chapters, we will 
explore why and how this was so 
II The International Labor Organization and Japanり
1. The Dilemma of the Japanese Government 
As one of the allied powers m World War I, Japan played a 
.conspicuous role in the Paris Peace Conference, putting herself 
in the pos1 t10n of one of the ongmal”Big Five.” She held a 
seat in the. Governing Body of the ILO as one of the eight 
countries of“chief industrial importance.”However, poh ti cal 
;md diplomatic prominence and prestige she had achieved in 
such a short time was after all nothmg but an anomaly. TruelY 
Japanese capitalism had by this time established itself and she 
enjoyed an mdustrial prosperity, but it embraced still great 
many difficulties to conquer. 
In other words, as far as the ILO was concerned, Japan could 
hardly be on a par with her sister powers of Europe and 
America to set up standards as the ILO tried to require in 
order to achieve its superb goals. Certainly she had to face a 
les than thirty yen This shall apply equally to those who commit 
violence or mtimidation or slander in public agamst ao employer who 
does not join in a concerted discharge of workers or a worker who 
does not jom m a strike. 
It will be self-explanatory that what severe restrictions and punish-
ments the Japanese workers had to suffer un司erthese provisions in 
their formative days. 
1. Cf. Iwao Ayukawa: a History of Labor in M;odern Japan, Honolulu, 
1966, pp. 121-133 
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dilemma between of bemg a "big" original nation of the !LO 
committed to promoting the organization and of being a young 
and economically handicapped nat10n trymg to avoid the 
requirements to which she was obligated as a member." 
It seems to me that this dilemma could also be explamed m 
terms of Japanese psychological traits that tended to place 
high value on‘name’or‘face ' To the Japanese way of thmk-
ing, once you are affiliated with an orgamzat10n, it is a virture 
that you should be loyal to 1t. Also, at the same time, probably 
she wanted to keep up with the “name”of being an equa1 
allies with the world powers. So her dilemma was aggravated 
This was interestmgly shown m her efforts to secure special 
country exemption with regard to the Hours of Work Conven 
tion, 1919, for example, which I do not intend to touch on 
here.町 Theproblem of this dilemma coupled with psychological 
background may be well worth noting in understanding the 
representat10n issue m the ensuing chapter. 
2. The Reactions of Organized Labor 
The workers' attitude toward the ILO underwent changes as 
the representation issue of the labor delegate at the ILつtook
various stages At first both leftists and rightists of labor 
movement reioiced over the Labor Charter of the Peace Treaty 
and the estabishment of the ILO based on that Charter. Since 
the Japanese Government signed the Treaty and ratified it, 
the mnoc四 tworking class hastily thought that freedom of 
association and union activity together with other promises 
declared m the Charter to promote the welfare of the working 
people would be granted, and hence they could have a voice m 
1. See, Jwao Ayusawa, International Labor Legislation: pp 207 23, 
New York, 1920 
2 Cf Tamon Maeda, Kokusai Rodo (International Labor), Ch. Six, 
Tokyo, 1927. 
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the International Labor Conference.り Totheir disappointment, 
however, they_ soon realized that the basic policy of the 
government to suppress any labor move立ient remained unaltered. 
The disappointment soon took the form of attack and dispara-
gement, against the organization itself and even hartred and 
antagonism to the individual labor delegate chosen by the 
government.'' 
The rightist trade union center Sodome1 had taken the attitude 
to reject the ILO until 1924, and then changed their policy into 
cooperation. The reason you will see in the following chapter 
Three, 2. The Ieftis trade union center Hyogikai (Nippon Rodo 
Kumiai Hyogikai, Japan Labor Union Council) on the other, did 
not reject it at first, then turned to an avowed attack around 
1926 0孔叫
we could explain these react10ns of the organized workers 
to、11ardthe ILO from their great expectations that the ILO 
might lend hand to realizmg freedom of union activity m 
Japan. As of 1924 after the government changed its policy, 
which will be studied in the followmg chapter, a workers' 
delegate came to be chosen exclusively from the rightist camp 
which drove the Japanese labor movement into splits. Of 
cource, this is not the sole reason for the splits and yet, 1t is 
a very important one to be no doubt, though this pomt tends 
to be overlooked by the histofy books on laborロiovement.
The right wingers who monopolyzed the nomination of the 
Workers' Delegate, which was the very intent of the government, 
mcreased their strength, and the left wingers, who were always 
1. Kanju Kato，“！LO田dLabor Legislation m Japan勺 RodoSek目白（the
Workers' World〕， Vol4，者10,Oct, 1919, Tokyo. pp 7-10. 
2. Kikuchi, lsao, Nippon Rodo Rippo no Hatten〔theDevelopment of 
Japanese Labor Legislation), Tokyo, 1932, pp. 375-3祁
3. ( 1〕 Kyochokai,op cit : pp 1400・1401.
(i) Ohara Institute of SoロalResearch, Rodo Nenkan (the La』r
Year of Japan), Toi可o,1926, p. 474 
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placed outside of such nomination, bitterly opposed to the very 
existence of the IL0.1> 
Interestingly enough, it was the very question of labor 
representation issue at the International Labor Conference that 
caused the first of ever on-going schisms among the Japanese 
labor movement, thus aggravating the conflicts within the 
move立ientbefore 1945. It is a pity to see the weak umonism 
all the more weakened by such mternal strife, which was 
another aspect of the ILO’s impact, but this is beyond the scope 
of the present article. 
11. The Representation Issue at the International 
Labor Conference 
1. The Protests Against the Credentials of the Workers' 
Delegate, 1919-1923 
Under the unique character of the ILO’s tnpartit盟国戸 orga-
nized labor was to be given an equal status with governments 
and employers within the ILO. One may easily imagine that 
the Chapter Xfil of the Peace Treaty would have puzzled the 
authorities, as until then m 1919, organized labor was nothing 
but the object of oppression to the eye of the Government. 
Now that Japan signed the Treaty, she was under obligation 
to abide by the Labor Charter Xfil.'' Particularly its Article 
389 requires each Member State to chose non-government 
delegates in agreement with the industrial organizations, if 
such orgamzat10ns exist, which are most representative of 
!. Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, Rodo Undo N四伊（theAnnual 
Report of Labor Movement: Confidential), 1926, Tokyo. p. 51-61. 
2 The Constitution of the !LO: Article 3. item 1 
3. Vat-Nippon Teikoku Gikai shi (the Record of Proceedings of the 
Imperial Diet of Japan), Vo) 12,. 1920, p. 428. See the discussion 
regarding the repeal of the Public Peace Police Act proposed by M p_ 
Ichiro K1yose and others. 
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employers and workpeople. Furthermore, the credentials of 
delegates thus chosen are subject to scrutmy by the Conference 
and their admittance may be refused by two-thirds of the 
votes cast by the delegetes present, if such nominat10n is 
deemed not to have done in accordance with the requirement " 
As a matter of course, the Japanese Government was most 
reluctant to consult the existing workers' organizations, such 
as Yuai Kai or any other labor umon, m selecting a Workers' 
Delegate, because such action would be tantamount to the 
official recogmt10n of a labor union.勾
For the first session of the ILO Conference m 1919 the 
Japanese Government nominated Mr. Uhei Masumoto who was 
a Chief Engmeer and the Director of Ship-building Coロ1pany.
No one would fail to see from his title that he was neither a 
worker nor a member of a trade union. The method taken by 
the Goyernment was this: The workers m the industrial 
establishments in each province selected their representatives 
to a provincial meeting which was set up especially for the 
propose of selecting candidates 'to the national meeting. These 
provincial meetings sent their delegates to a national general 
meeting, which was asked to submit three names to the 
Government The Government appointed one of these three as 
the labor delegate 町 Theorganized workers set at naught this 
method and completely reiected 1 t.勺 Mostcandidates sent to 
the general meetmg belonged to the managmg class as they 
were selected by their emploers.町
This device was adopted, according to the official explanation, 
1 The Constitution of the !LO: Article 3, item 9. 
2 Ayusawa, Internat1onal Labor Legislation, p 216. 
3. For the procedual details, see Kikuchi, op cit pp, 377-378 
4 Magosaburo Domae, "The Contents of the General Meeting and Our 
Claim，＇’ Rodo Sekai, op cit.: pp 43-49 
5 See Shingo Ka1de and Yosh10 Toda, Kokusai-Rodo Kikan (The 
Jnternat1onal Labor Organization), Tokyo, 1960, p. 70. 
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吋nview of the fact that trade unions have only recently been 
established m Japan, and mclude only a small fraction of the 
workers -less than 30,000 out of the total of 4,000,000 -the Gov-
ernment considered 1t necessary to adopt a special procedure in 
order to ascertain the wishes of the general body of mdustnal 
workers in Japan.”り
The Credential Commission of the ILO Conference was 
apφare汎tlysatisfied with this explanation supplied by the 
Japanese Government.り Moreover,Mr Hudson, legal adviser 
of the League of Nations, provided an interpretation of Article 
389 which proved to be in favor 。fthe acti。nof the Japanese 
Government 
Hudson served to be a sort of a very advantageous weapon to 
the Japanese Government Delegates whenever the credentatls 
of the Japanese Workers' Delegate was at stake m the subse-
quent conferences Accordmg to the yardsticks by the legal 
adviser to test whether a country has discharged its obligat10n 
under the third paragraph of Article 389, th泡 Credential
Commission should first determme as to a particular country 
whether any industrial organizatins exist which are represen・
tative of employers or workpeople. Smce the Japanese 
Government had consistently insisted that this word”rep re-
sentative”should be mterpreted m terms of the numerical 
standard only, the Conference could rtot but be persuaded to 
admit the credentials of the Workers' Delegate m quest10n. 
In other words, it was a very hard thing for the Conference 
to find a good田 useto defeat the Japanese government. 
What I am concerned here is neither technical nor legal 
aspects of this question, that is, how article 387 should be 
read. So 1 t may suffice to s坦ythat the position of the Japanese 
1. !LO, International Labor Conference, Record of Procee<¥mgs, First 
Session, 1919, p 206. 
2 Ibid. 
3. Ibid: p. 207. 
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Government, though undoubtedly defensive and e玄cursatory,
was not at all groundless. However, one word mai be added, 
citing tbe Minority Report of the Credential Commission 
submitted by M L Jouhaux:" 
“. at the Peace Conference Commission on Internat10nal 
Labor Leg1slat10n at Paris in 1919, Mr ・Barnes, Mmister 
without portfoho and representative of the Bnt田hGovern-
ment, replying to a quest10n by Mr. Oka, representative of 
Japan, stated that‘the scheme was designed to develop 
orgamzation', and Mr. Vandervelde, Minister, representing 
Belgium, also stated that Part XJII was conc1eved 'with a 
view to developing trade union organization.' 
Considering that there exist m Japn workers associations 
which embrace 150,000 workers ; 
that .these associat10ns may develop 1f Part XJII of the 
Treaty is applied in Japan m its letter and in its spirits; 
， 
It was quite evident that the Japanese Governme坑tdid not 
want to develop or foster any. workers' orgamzat10n, otherwise 
it could have taken a different method. 
Indignant at such attitude of the Japanese Government strong 
protests were made consecutively at every sess10n of the 
Internat10nal Labor Conference by trade unionists.町 Although
the protests by the Japanese workers were made through direct 
writing to the ILO or to such comrades, as Gompers of the 
American Federation of Labor or Mertens of Belgium, it is a 
great irony or sometimes even exciting to read records that 
all the Workers’Delegates chose泊 bythe Government invoked, 
1. Iρ，Record of Proceedings, Fifth Session, 1923, p. 228-230. 
2 With one exception of 出eSecond Sess10n which was Marithne 
Confer四 ce.The Japanese Seaman’s Umon was and has been the most 
advanced and established labor organization in Japan, really worthy of the 
name of a trade umon The Govemnent dared not to defy its existence 
and selected a Workers’Delegate m consultation with the Umon 
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without exception, most critical allegation against the labor 
policy of the Government In short, the Government nominated 
the Workers, Delegate only to be bit their own hands. When 
the Government and organized labor was so sharply antagonistic 
against each other, it is a common sense that one should 
expect that a delegate created by the anti-labor campぬoud
be a puppet who wili act as agent for their mterests As we 
ミshallsee, this was not the case with the Japanese Workers' 
Delegates. 
In the case of Mr. Uhei Matsumoto, the first Labor Delegate 
to the First Session of the ILO Washington Conference in 19四，
he was so bitterly attacked by organized lahor and even 
intimidated not to accept the nommation.り Hebravely rejected 
such intim1dat10n and did attend. the Conference at the risk of 
Ins bodily danger. Seemingly he had prepared himself to speak 
£or the good of the workpeople m the country. でroa great 
surprise to the Govednme汎t,Mr. Masumoto turned out七obe 
a spokeeman of the Japanese working class, acrnsmg m a most 
piercing tongue the oppres田vepolicy of the Japanese Govern-
ment Especially in the discussion of the special country 
treatment requested by Japan in the Hours of Work Conven-
tion, Mr. Matsumoto fiercely objected and entreated the 
Conference to reject ・such request because "such special 
treatment for Japan is nothing but the helpmg hand of oppres-
sion for helpless toilers, who are seeking ・the light of social 
justice and freedom.叫》
One of the most dramatic moment回 mein the case of Mr. 
Keiichi Matsumoto in the Third Session in 1921 which was 
convened to discuss agricultural labor Mr Matsumoto who was 
an admimstrator of Okayama Orphanage and President of 
1. Ayusawa, Int'! Labor Legislation, p 217. 
2. !LO, Record of Proceedings, 1919, p. 159. As to the issue of ぬe
special country treatment, also see Tamon Mayeda, op c比
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,Orphanage Agricultural School, himself denied his credentials 
and submitted a lengthy memorandum, accusmg the attitude 
of the Government in his own nominat10n, explamed how such 
conduct was in contravention to the ILO spirit.り Mr.Mat匂
sumoto was not a worker as his title suggests but he devotedly 
spoke for the good of the mass of the Japanese workpeople. 
Though it may be a too lengthy citation, let me quote his 
words to demonstrate one of the examples how the Workers' 
Delegates nominated by the Government acted m the Conference・ 
吋 cameto this Internat10nal Labor Cnference as the Japanese 
Workers' Delegate, but I must first of al say that before my 
departure from Japan, complaints, mainly from existing labor 
orgamzations, were made with regard to the procedure of my 
nommat10n, to the effect that although there exists in Japan 
particularly no systematic organization of agricultural labor, it 
is against the principles of the Peace Treaty to select a 
Workers' Delegate without consulting the most representative 
organization of workers m existence. The reason which brought 
me here notwithstanding such a singular position is what I 
would like to explain and to make understood. 
“ 
“The Japanese Government, experiencing great difficulty in 
findmg a suitable Workers' Delegate, asked me to accept 
nomination as such which offer I first defimtely refused, as I 
had no intent10n of presummg to represent Japanese labor as 
a whole at the International Labor Conference, although I am 
to some extent conversant with the actual conditions of 
agricultural wひrkers,having myself worked on a farm for 
nearly ten years. 
”. • If I cared only for my perscnal interests I would have 
rejected the nominat10n . . However, I learned that even if I 
did so, th氾 Governmentwould repeat the same procedure and 
1. !LO, Record of Proceedings, 1921, p. 631-633. 
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no more representative Delegate would be sent to the Con-
ference. Therefore I thought it advisable to defend the 
interests of our workers as much as possible, and to explai立
plainly and frankly, as也eopportum ties offer, the peculiar 
atmosphere in Japan. 
“After thoroughly considering the matter in the latter reason, 
I made up my mind to attend this Conference. I am quite 
aware of the singularity of my position and I also expect that 
the question of my credent阻 Iswill be brought up here. I have 
nothing whatever to fear if I am not permitted to attend the 
Conference. On the contrary I shoud feel compensated, if the 
fact of my being refused recognition, which means the mter-
national recognition of Japanese labor unions, would rouse the 
Government authorities and the opponents of social progress 
from their dreams and pave the way for sending to the next 
Conference the most representative Delegate of Japanese 
workers. No matter whether I am refused or admitted to the 
Conference. The only thing I intend to do is to fight for the 
common mterests of labor in Japan and m the whole world, 
and to make the voice of Japanese workers heard, directly or 
indirectly, to the Workers' Delegates of the various countries 
assembled here. 
”I appeal to your sense of iustice and to your ideal of 
internat10nal sohdarity of workers to help the movement in 
Japan, . .＇’り
At the Fourth Session of 1922, Mr. Yosh1haru Tazawa was 
agam anything but a puppet of the Government, though he was 
the Director of Kyocho Kai, Association for the Maintenance 
of Harmon10us Relat10ns between Capital and Labor, which 
was a semi-governmental body, much criticized by organized 
1 !LO Record of Proceedings, 1921, p. 63. : Memorandum recordmg 
the question of his credentials, submitted by Mr K. Matsumoto, 
Japanese Workers' Delegate. 
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合orkers at the time of ltS establishment. Yet even tbe・ 
Director of the organization of such nature, too, proved to be 
古~ except10n in the attack of the Government labor policy at 
the ILO Conference to Which he was sent as the Workers' 
Delegate. He warned the Conference saying，吋 begto your 
attention towards the International Labor Orgamzation. 
Already some labor organizations in Japan are ignoring the 
existence and fuoction of the International Labor Conference. 
I fear this sentiment will contmue to grow, so long as the 
declarations of the Government Delegate in the Conference 
vanish ・into empty pronouncementsり and so long as the 
Conference decis10ns mostly remain unratified as they are now. 
I already-hope you will pay closer atention to such tendencies 
.and ・seek the necessary remedies.同〉
These "workers’” protests at the Conferences were not made 
in vain. The Fifth Session of the ILO finally became the last 
stage of the series of allegations, as far ’as the representat10n 
issue was concerned. For the second time Mr. Riyemon Uno, 
the Workers' Delegate who was the President of. the Society 
for Engineering Educat10n himself protested against his own 
nominat10n by the Government. Of course, several Japanese 
trade unions sent protests as usual, quite separate from Mr. 
Uno’s action 町
: I By this he means the promises the Government Delegates had been 
making to enact a Trade Union Act in order to alllow workers freedom 
of association with a full legal status. 
2 ILO, Record of Proceedings, Fourth Session, 1922, p 57, and also 
see pp. 55-56 
3. For example, a trade unionist, Mr H. E五satome’sleter of protest 
!LO, Record of Proceedings, Fifth Session, 1923, p. 237, "With the 
confidence of the Kansai Rodo Kumiai Domeikai (the Federation of 
Trade Unions m the Western Part of Japan〕， theJun Kojo Kai〔the
Union of Workers in the Military Arsenals〕， theN 1ppon Bijutsu 
YuzenKo k山田ai(Union of Workers in Artistic Dyeing Works. in
Jap田）， and the Osaka Tekko Kumiai (Umon of Osaka Iron Workers), 
I hereby ... " 
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Mr. U'lo’s post ti on was vtrtually the same as tha.t of Mr. 
Matsumoto in the 'J;'hird Conference. He said, "a.ItおoughI 
myself do not rep目 sentand am not in a・ position to advocate 
in the real sense, the organized workers m Japan, I thought it 
would not be meaningless that I accept the ・nommation as 
Workers' Delegate if I utilise the opportunity afforded me ・to 
attend the Conference ．．．”り
Now this time in the Fifth Session, the Japanese Governmen.t 
adopted a new method, thus compromising to the ccy of出e
organized workers, as it became apparent t危atthis issue was 
partakmg of the worst nature year after year. The Government 
realized that it was put mto a very embarassing position. 
Accordmg to the new method the trade unions each having 
1,000 or more members were allowed to vote for the 回 ndidate
for the Workers' Delegate, in the ratio of one vote per every 
thousand workers. But factories employing 1,000 or more 
workers were also given the same nght. According to Mr. 
Uno, "the number of. votes to which the organized workers 
were entitled was less 出anone-tenth of the number of votes 
which the unorganized workers were entitled.町 Furth町 more
one should not overlook the important implicatiρn behind the 
scene. By allowing “big”unions ta participate in th必 selection
of the Workers' Delegate, the Government deliberately coul<J: 
shut out the innumerous radical leftist unions which were all 
small in 出eirmembership 的
The Government, if it had to select a Workers' Delegate in 
consultation with the trade umons, .wanted to select at le<!St 
a cooperative or moderate person, and on these Ii由民 iteven 
succeeded in forming big company unions within the Government 
Navy Arseゴials''to control the number of vote as many as 
I !LO, Record of Proceeding, Fifth Session, 1923, p. 237. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Su日~ehiro, op cit : p 65
4. See Ibid , p.120. 
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possible. This had treme血dousundesirabie bearing on the 
history of the Jpanese labor movement. This very-issue of 
selecting a Workers' Delegate to the ILO presented a clue 
toward the antagonism between the rightists and the leftists.り
The leftist unions finally ceased to send a protest the comple' 
te)y neglected or at least pretended to, the existence of the 
ILO. The attitude of the leftist unions seemed also to be 
influenced by the international labor movement which was also 
split into the Amsterdom International that sponsored the ILO, 
and the Third International under the Russian influence. 
To all these protests the answer of the Japanese Government 
was always the same, as was mentioned before. The Credential 
Commission, too, could not say more than that it was hoped 
in the future methods might be found for choosing the Workers' 
Delegate which would give general satisfaction and would 
avoid the protests of the organized workers.勾 Touse the 
words of ・the Majority Report of the Commission in 1923, it 
took note ”with satisfaction" of “the progress which the Imperial 
Government has made in the method of selecting the workers' 
Delegate. More and more attention is being paid to the 
workers' organizations. While not questioning the legal validity 
of the method adopted by the Japanese Government on this 
question, it is hoped that m the future methods may be found 
for choosing the Workers' Delegate which will give general 
satisfaction and will avoid the protests of the organized workers 
which have now been repeated at four International Labor 
Conferences. Appreciatmg as it does the progressive efforts 
which have already been made by the Japanese Government m 
this direction, the Commission feels confident that such methods 
will successfully be discovered before next year’s Conference. 
”The majority of the Commission considers that, as it cannot 
1 Suyehiro, op. cit. p. 120-121. 
2. !LO, Record of Proceedmgs, Fifth Session, 1923, p. 28. 
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Qbtam sufficient informat10n regardmg the nature and strength 
of the workers' groups in whose n即時 protestshave been made, 
it cannot propose the reiection of the credentials of the Delegate 
concerned.叫》
Truely there is no douht that the Japanese Government was 
obliged to take any action m face of such strong and tenacious 
protests of the workers. W!)y the Government had to modify 
its policy, though not completely? We can easily guess that 
the reason why it was obliged to make ”the progress”m the 
method of selectmg the Workers, Delegate could be attributed 
to the strong protests both by the Government-selected Dele-
gates themselves and by the trade umomsts acted as individually 
or through their organizations. The Government, bemg repu-
gnant to recognize the labor union, defied its existence and 
selected the Workers' Delegate by the Government itself If the 
Government had consulted the labor organization regarding the 
select10n, such act10n would have meant the authorized 
recognition of the existence of a trade union. However, at last 
the Government realized that it could no longer force such 
attitude at the Internat10nal Labor Conference. 
The slight modification the Government made this time in 
the Fifth Sess10n was the begmning of the compromise which 
would pave the way to the de fμcto, though not formal and 
legal, recognition of the trade umon orgamzat1on and union 
activity in the country. But for the existence of the !LO, 
workers would have no means whatsoever to express themselves, 
with all the depnvat10n of freedom of associat10n. But for 
the ILO, there was no freedom of speech to speak for a labor 
union or strikes So we cannot highly thmk of even this much 
of changes too much m the attitude of the Government, though 
with limitat10n. 
1 !LO, Record of Proceddings, Fifth Session, 1923, pp. 227-228. 
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・2.・ De Facto Recognition aftぽ 1924.
The Sixth Session・ of the International Labor Confer四 cein 
1924 could・ be匂saidto be a memorial occasion in the histor手 of
the Japanese labor movement. There the genuine representative 
of the organized workers was for the first time given seat at 
the ILO and gained opportum ty to speak for themselves through 
their own spokesman. The Japanese Government, feeling that 
they could rio longer continue to fool the Conference, finally 
decided to choose the Workers’Delegate only in consultation 
with the existing trade unions,'' though thξthousand-member 
requirement remained unchanged. 
To the great joy of the organized workers, Mr Buni1 Suzuki, 
President of Sodomei, General Confederat10n of Japanese Labor, 
was nominated as the Workers' Delegate. Since then, organized 
labor in Japan began to attack the Government through their 
own spokesmen, especially against the ban on the fundamental 
right of freedom of association among workers. Indeed, Mr. 
Suzuki’s contribution was really marvellous and worthy of 
applause He never failed to miss every opportunity in the 
successive conferences he attended, explaining the workers' 
situation in Japan, soliciting the help, disclosing the punishments 
the Government imposed on labor, etc. 
One of the most important contribution he made was the 
resolution for mvestigating freedom of association m respective 
countries which he proposed and led the Conference to adopt 
such resolution.町 Strangelyenough, this立iostbasic nght of 
freedom of association had never been put into form of neither 
convention nor recommendation at the ILO befo問 1948,'>except 
1. This change was made pos91ble as the Govermnent took the advice 
of Mr. Tamon M町eda,Govermnent Delega包. See Kaide田 dToda, 
op cヨt. p 73. 
2 !LO, Record of Proceedings, Sixth Session: p 542 
3. It was not until after World明larI in 1948 when the Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Conventrnn (No. 
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a very 'limited case of agricultural workers under the Convention 
No. 11 of 1921. At any rate he was the very person to pave 
the ・way to the Freedom.of Associat10n Enqmty of 1930." 
I should refrain from counting the number of comments that 
the Japanese Workers' Delegates had made at the IL,O after 
they gained their representation m 1923 But the pomt must 
be made that every delegate was unanimous in their accusation 
against the Government for restricting workers' freedom of 
association.勾 Evenafter the representation issue was settled in 
favor of orgamzed Iahor, freedom of association never ceased 
to be a central issue at the Conference between土hedelegates 
of the Government and workers. Confronted with the tenacity 
of the Workers' Delegate, the Japanese Government Delegates 
at last resorted to the panacea in international politics, i. e.: 
"If the question of the. right of association is to be considered 
in detail with a view to the establishment of international 
obligations in the matter, both the legal and political aspects 
pf the problem must be considered, otherwise the serious 
quest10n of State sovereignty might become invoked.叫＇ This 
statement thrusts deeply mto the very weakness of the ILO as 
an international orgamzation To demonstrate it for example, 
at the Fifth Conference, Mr. Perez of Venezuela says：”there 
.exist nowhere, either in the Treaty of Peace or 1n the Statutes 
of this Organization, any text which would authorise the 
International Labor Conference to pbss a vote which would m 
87) was adopted by the !LO. ・So it should be noted that the resolution 
and the Enquiry based on the resolut10n Mr Suzuki initiated was the 
only kind regarding the fundamental nght of orgamzation 
1. !LO, Studies and Reports, Seines A, ~32 ・ Freedom of Associati。n,
Vol V, Geneva, 1930, 
2. Record of Proceedings: Seventh Session, pp. 100-104 
Tenth Sess10n, p 268 
11th Sess10n, p 17. 
12th Session, pp 176-179田 dpp. 268'274 
and so on 
3. !LO, Record of Proceedings, Sixth Sess10n, p 543 
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some sort reflect blame on the conduct of sovereign_ States, I 
think a vote for the Mofority Repot (of the Credential 
Co mission to reject the credentials of the Japanese Workers' 
Delegate -by the .author) could be interpreted as throwing blame 
on the Japanese Government We are not here to act as judges 
in any controversy between the Japanese Government and its 
own workers and I consider that 1t would be very dangerous 
for the Conference to adopt such a method ... I fear that the 
Governments, which at present constitute the only effective 
support of the ILO, would tend to lose al mterest m that 
Organization.”＂ 
Even the Freedom of Association Enqmry which the Japanese 
Workers must have looked forward to 1 tsfindmg of some sort 
of accusation of the Japanese Government labor pohcy, ended 
in a mere research paper, detailed and truthful ・nature of the 
Enquiry notwithstanding. We may easily recognize that the 
whole tone of the Enquiry carries with it a considerable amount 
of reservation. It is more than evident that the condition of 
Japan when the Enquiry was made did not leave any room for 
freedom of workers' organizations I do not think that the 
ILO was not without knowledge of such actualities, and the 
followmg comment did prove that they were aware of it：”it 
may be pointed out that in the case of employers' organizations 
‘free’associations seem generally to enjoy a grater freedom 
than ‘legal’associations because they are not bound by any 
special law, whereas m the case of workers' organizations, the 
absence of a defimte legal status guaranteed by a special la、v
has been found to be a handicap.”＂ The conclusion the Enquiry 
drew was optimistic placing high expectations on the possible 
enactment of a trade union act by the Government.句
1. !LO, Record of Proceedings, Fifth Session, p 75. 
2. Studies and Reports, op. cit 430. 
3. Ibid. pp. 458 459 
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I could thmk of a couple of reasons why the ILO dared not 
use harsh language in that Enquiry. First, it was probably 
due to the considerations on the part of the ILO of Japan’s 
increasing prestige -in international politics in those days 
Secondly, it was the reluctance of the ILO, as an mcip1ent 
internat10nal organization, to antagonize member Governments. 
This is very likely, seeming that Japan was the original big 
five and occupied a seat in the Governing Body of the ILO as 
one of the eight countries of chief mdustrial importance. 
Another explanation may be that at the time of Enquiry, Japan 
was really oriented to the most liberal posture throughout her 
pre-World War I days -Japanese historians called the 192日’s
"Taisho Democracy" nammg after the Emperor Taisho Truly 
the universal suffrage was granted in 1925 ; the notorious 
Articles 17 and 30 of the Public Peace Police Act were abolished 
in 1926 ; and a Trade Union Billり wassubmitted to the Imperial 
Diet‘three times' with a view to affording a trade union w1 th 
legal status. Japan’s social legislation advanced greatly. Even 
a foreign paper reported about it.' Democracy was openly 
advocated and the labor movement saw its expansion 
But, Japan, after al, was a fragile newcommer in the world 
capitalist competition and she had to suffer severe economic 
depress10ns almost once m every two years after 1919.町 In
addition, the mdustnalized West were putting screws on Japan 
with her trade expans10n and then, she had no choice but to give 
1 Regardmg the Trade Union Bils, see. the articles in Rodo Kyokai 
Zassi (the monthly Journal of the Japan Institute of Labor〕byTakao 
Nishioka (Nos. 59, 60 and 109〕andToru Watanabe (Nos. 87 and 88). 
2. New York Herald (5, December, 1926) reported under the heading: 
“Nippon Social Laws Keeping up with Industry" regardig Japan’s 
progress in the field of social legislation目
3 Suyehiro, op cit: p. 71. Also, se, Hyoye Ouchi, Ke1zaishi (Economic 
E五story)in Keizai Nihon Shoshi (A Short History of Modern Japan) 
op. Cit., pp. 110-121. 
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up al the atteロtptsto rat1onahze her industrial relations even 
at least m a very modera.te. form of a trade umon act. Cheap 
labor by suppressing・ freedom of assoロat10nwas almost the 
only recourse to her econom1c expansion. Ephemeral Taisho. 
Democracy and its subseqμent y担問・ofcomparatively liberal 
mood naturally had its own Iim1tation. The fear of mcreasing 
strength of the organized labor drove the G.overnment to enact 
new rest口ctivelaws to replace the abolisbed provisions of土he
Police Act. Namely, the Public Peace Maintenance Act, 1925 ; 
the Act Respecting the Punishment of Violent Conduct, 1926; 
and the Labor Disputes Conciliatrnn Act, 1926, while other 
articles of the Police Act were stil in operation The actual 
picture of freedom of assa口at10nin Japan was almost desparate, 
de facto recognit10n bemg undermmed recognlt10n. 
Conclusion . 
It 1s no doubt that we may assert that the !LO, through the 
representation issue of the Workers' Delegate at its conferences 
and in many other indirect ways, greatly contributed to a 
virtual recognition of workers' right to orgamze and engage 
in trade umon activities in Japan But for the !LO, this 
tolerance of trade um on activ1 ties would never have been a 
reality in autocratic Japan in her pre-war days. That the 
Japanese Government took such great mterest in the !LO and 
was so loyal to it was very fortunate to workers, for she could 
have easily chosen what is called ‘incomplete delegatrnn,' by 
simply neglectmg her workpeople. 
Under the tri-part1te system of the !LO, Member State must 
send complete tri-partite delegation consisting of two govern-
ment delegates, one employers' delegate and one workers' 
d.elegate (!LO Constttution Article 3-1）目 Ifa Member State fails 
to nominate one of the non Government delegates, the other non-
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Government delegate shall nbt'.iillow to vote. (Article 4-2). Also 
from the purely financial p回目 of view, It Is no small 
economic burden for a distant C凹 ntrylike Japan to send a. 
complete delegation, espeロallywhen there W宙 noaeroplane. 
For re渇sonsI do not know, the Japa0ese Government ・never 
failed to send complete delegation every time sinιe thefoundmg 
of the ILO, irrespective of the political and financial burdens. 
Once more this was truly fortunate for the orgamzed workers 
in Japan, seeing that incomplete delegation was not disgraceful 
to a member country in those days. Rather it was a common 
thing --According to the report of the Credential Commission 
in the Seventh sess10n in 1925," of 46 states represented, as 
few as 29 have sent complete delegation. 
This de facto recogmtion thus brought about, however, could 
never be extended beyond Its own boundary, nor the efforts of 
the Workers' Delegate at the ILO were s田 cesfulin realizing 
the real recogmtion of freedom of associat10n Withm the 
country This was owmg to the hmitation of the ILO Itself as 
stated already, the autocratic character of the Governm町it' 
and to the infantile stage of the Japanese workers movement, 
yet weak and immature as to stand up to fight for their own 
good or to back up the activities of the Worker' Delegates 
within the ILO. 
In the meantime the poh tical ch mate of the world was 
getting worse, and there was little room for Japan to work on 
any d町nocraticattempt, much less for freedom of association. 
And the bud of free union activity was to be nipped off before 
bloommg. Even the de fact recogmtion of trade umonism was 
to be suffocated. Finally Japan withdrew from the ILO in 
1938, and that was the end of everything. And it was not 
until 1945 after Japan’s surrender in World War I, when the 
Japaese Workers could gain the real freedom of union activity 
1 Record of Proceedings, Seventh Session, 1929, p. 592 
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through the full-fledged Trade Union Act of 1945. 
In concluding, 1t might be appropriate to add a few words 
in connection with so-called ”the ILO Convention No. 87 
ratification issue，＇’ which, just until! recently, had been the 
center of the hottest pohtcai controversy m this country. 
Back in 1958, the issue was first started "again”by way of 
appeal to the ILO by a Japanese public employees' union, when 
the Japanese Government refused to engage in collective 
bargaining through the discharged union officers of the union. 
And, then, the issue was consolidated as the demand for the 
ratification of the Freedom of Associat10n and Protect10n 
of the Right to Organize Convention, No. 87, adopted by the 
ILO in 1948. 
To skipp off al the details, the Japanese Government fmally 
had to accept the decision of the Fact-Finding and Conci!iat10n 
Comm自由onof the ILO to send the mvestigating group to 
Japan, on condition that the Commission may have the agreement 
from the Japanese Government. The outcome of the mvestiga-
t10n of the Commission is published m the voluminous 758-page 
report known more popularly in Japan as the ”Dreyer’S 
Report.’＂ 
This issue may be said to be the postwar version of what 
happened m 1920’s, which 1s the theme of this paper. The 
Japanese umomsts never failed to forget the recourse to solicit 
the help of the international organization when they had 
problems even after they had gained a series of the fullfledged 
labor laws Viewed the prewar representation issue as coupled 
with the postwar rat1ficat10n issue, it will become more 
significant as providing ms1ght mto certain part of traditions 
imbued in the Japanese labor relations climate. 
1 See, Report of the Fact Finding and Conciliation Commission of 
Freedom of Association concerning Persons Employed in the Public 
Sector in Japan, !LO, Geneva, 1965. 
